Douven, Igor and Rott, Hans (2018) From probabilities to categorical beliefs: Going beyond toy models. JOURNAL OF LOGIC AND COMPUTATION, 28 (6). pp. 1099-1124. ISSN 0955-792X, 1465-363X
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According to the Lockean thesis (LT), a proposition is believed just in case it is highly probable. While this thesis enjoys strong intuitive support, it is known to conflict with seemingly plausible logical constraints on our beliefs. One way out of this conflict is to make probability 1 a requirement for belief, but most have rejected this option for entailing what they see as an untenable skepticism. Recently, two new solutions to the conflict have been proposed that are alleged to be non-skeptical. We compare these proposals with each other and with the LT, in particular with regard to the question of how much we gain by adopting any one of them instead of the probability 1 requirement, that is of how likely it is that one believes more than the things one is fully certain of.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | STABILITY; PARADOX; VIRTUES; |
| Subjects: | 100 Philosophy & psychology > 100 Philosophy |
| Divisions: | Philosophy, Art History, History, and Humanities > Institut für Philosophie > Lehrstuhl für Theoretische Philosophie (Prof. Dr. phil Hans Rott) |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Gernot Deinzer |
| Date Deposited: | 13 Dec 2019 09:47 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Dec 2019 09:47 |
| URI: | https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/13894 |
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