Buchholz, Wolfgang and Cornes, Richard and Ruebbelke, Dirk (2018) Public goods and public bads. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, 20 (4). pp. 525-540. ISSN 1097-3923, 1467-9779
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
In many empirically relevant situations agents in different groups are affected by the provision of a public characteristic in divergent ways. Whereas for one group it represents a public good, it is a public bad for another group. Applying Cornes and Hartley's aggregative game approach, we analyze a general model in which such contentious public characteristics are present and are provided cooperatively. In particular, we establish neutrality results with respect to redistribution and growth of income, infer the effects of preference changes and coalition formation, and present a technology paradox. Finally, we compare the outcome of voluntary provision of the contentious public characteristic with the Pareto-optimal solution, highlighting a potential conflict between equity and efficiency in this case.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | PRIVATE PROVISION; MODEL; |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Divisions: | Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Finanzwissenschaft, insbesondere Umweltökonomie (Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Buchholz) |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Gernot Deinzer |
| Date Deposited: | 10 Mar 2020 10:58 |
| Last Modified: | 10 Mar 2020 10:58 |
| URI: | https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/14189 |
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