Buchholz, Wolfgang and Cornes, Richard and Ruebbelke, Dirk (2012) Matching as a cure for underprovision of voluntary public good supply. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 117 (3). pp. 727-729. ISSN 0165-1765, 1873-7374
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)Abstract
Matching mechanisms are widely regarded as providing a promising way to cure the public good underprovision problem, but the Pareto optimal interior matching equilibrium emerges only under very special conditions. However, we show that public good underprovision is normally avoided. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | EFFICIENT PRIVATE PROVISION; Public goods; Matching; Pareto optimality |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Divisions: | Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Entpflichtete oder im Ruhestand befindliche Professoren > Lehrstuhl für Finanzwissenschaft, insbesondere Umweltökonomie (Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Buchholz) |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Gernot Deinzer |
| Date Deposited: | 04 May 2020 05:20 |
| Last Modified: | 04 May 2020 05:20 |
| URI: | https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/17661 |
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