Arnold, Lutz G. (2012) A Game-Theoretic Foundation for Competitive Equilibria in the Stiglitz-Weiss Model. GERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 13 (2). pp. 211-227. ISSN 1465-6485,
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Financial intermediaries are, by definition, engaged in two-sided competition. Despite the well-known problems of achieving competitive solutions under two-sided price competition, models of financial intermediation are commonly solved for competitive equilibria. This article provides a game-theoretic foundation for competitive equilibria in one of the most important models of financial intermediation, the seminal StiglitzWeiss (1981) adverse selection model of the credit market with a continuum of borrower types.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | IMPERFECT INFORMATION; CREDIT; MARKETS; OLIGOPOLY; PRICE; Financial intermediation; asymmetric information; credit rationing |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Divisions: | Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Theoretische Volkswirtschaft (Prof. Dr. Lutz Arnold) |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Gernot Deinzer |
| Date Deposited: | 15 May 2020 06:52 |
| Last Modified: | 15 May 2020 06:52 |
| URI: | https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/18833 |
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