Buchholz, Wolfgang and Cornes, Richard and Ruebbelke, Dirk (2011) Interior matching equilibria in a public good economy: An aggregative game approach. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 95 (7-8). pp. 639-645. ISSN 0047-2727,
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If the equilibrium generated by a matching mechanism is to be the desired Pareto optimal outcome, it is necessary for every player to be at an interior solution at that equilibrium. Using the aggregative game approach developed by Comes and Hartley (2003, 2007), this paper analyzes the conditions under which matching mechanisms in a public good economy lead to interior matching equilibria at which all agents make strictly positive flat contributions to the public good. In particular, we show that the distribution of income among the agents is crucial for both the existence of interior matching equilibria and Warr neutrality in the case of matching. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | EFFICIENT PRIVATE PROVISION; GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES; VOLUNTARY PROVISION; COLLECTIVE ACTION; AGENTS; MODEL; Aggregative games; Matching mechanisms; Public goods; Warr neutrality |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Divisions: | Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Entpflichtete oder im Ruhestand befindliche Professoren > Lehrstuhl für Finanzwissenschaft, insbesondere Umweltökonomie (Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Buchholz) |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Gernot Deinzer |
| Date Deposited: | 05 Jun 2020 05:43 |
| Last Modified: | 05 Jun 2020 05:43 |
| URI: | https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/20519 |
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