Englmaier, Florian and Muehlheusser, Gerd and Roider, Andreas (2014) Optimal incentive contracts for knowledge workers. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 67. pp. 82-106. ISSN 0014-2921, 1873-572X
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)Abstract
We study optimal incentive provision for "knowledge workers", a crucial resource for many organizations. We augment a standard moral-hazard framework to reflect two key patterns: First, retention is a challenge because workers are free to leave; thereby harming their employer. Second, the value of the worker's outside option might depend on effort on the job. Optimal contracts that retain workers exhibit properties such as first-best effort and surplus, or non-responsiveness to changes in underlying conditions. Due to large rents, full retention is, however, costly for employers. Hence, even when socially inefficient, separation might occur in equilibrium. (c) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | CAREER CONCERNS; MORAL HAZARD; INFORMATION; EMPLOYMENT; PRINCIPAL; OPTIONS; AGENTS; FIRMS; Knowledge workers; Moral hazard; Limited commitment; Ex post outside option |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Divisions: | Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Mikroökonomik (Prof. Dr. Andreas Roider) |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Gernot Deinzer |
| Date Deposited: | 15 Nov 2019 09:22 |
| Last Modified: | 15 Nov 2019 09:22 |
| URI: | https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/10378 |
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