Buchholz, Wolfgang and Cornes, Richard and Ruebbelke, Dirk (2014) Potentially Harmful International Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision. ECONOMICA, 81 (322). pp. 205-223. ISSN 0013-0427, 1468-0335
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Experience from climate policy suggests that full cooperation among all countries is not a likely outcome. In this paper we therefore consider the case where only members of a subgroup of countries cooperate by reciprocally matching their public good contributions. In a two-stage game, matching rates are set at stage1 then national contributions are chosen at stage2. In the case of small coalitions, negative matching may result in the subgame-perfect equilibrium that decreases global public good provision and outsiders' welfare. Moreover, a growing number of countries may paradoxically entail a reduction of equilibrium public good supply.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | EFFICIENT PRIVATE PROVISION; ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS; GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES; FISCAL FEDERALISM; COLLECTIVE ACTION; POLICIES; TRADE; partial cooperation; coalition formation; public goods; matching; Pareto-optimality |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Divisions: | Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Finanzwissenschaft, insbesondere Umweltökonomie (Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Buchholz) |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Gernot Deinzer |
| Date Deposited: | 15 Nov 2019 11:36 |
| Last Modified: | 15 Nov 2019 11:36 |
| URI: | https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/10415 |
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