Rott, Hans (2017) Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the concept of belief. SYNTHESE, 194 (8). pp. 2695-2720. ISSN 0039-7857, 1573-0964
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Pragmatists have argued that doxastic or epistemic norms do not apply to beliefs, but to changes of beliefs; thus not to the holding or not-holding, but to the acquisition or removal of beliefs. Doxastic voluntarism generally claims that humans (sometimes or usually) acquire beliefs in a deliberate and controlled way. This paper introduces Negative Doxastic Voluntarism according to which there is a fundamental asymmetry in belief change: (i) humans tend to acquire beliefs more or less automatically and unreflectively, but (ii) they tend to withdraw beliefs in a controlled and deliberate way. I first present a variety of philosophical, empirical and logical arguments for Negative Doxastic Voluntarism. Then I raise two objections against it. First, the apparent asymmetry may result from a confusion of belief with other doxastic attitudes like assumption, supposition, hypothesis or opinion. Second, the apparent asymmetry seems to vanish if we focus on doxastic states rather than just beliefs. Some rejoinders and their consequences for the vague concept of belief are sketched.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | JUDGMENT; Doxastic voluntarism; Belief; Belief state; Belief change; Suspension of disbelief |
| Subjects: | 100 Philosophy & psychology > 100 Philosophy |
| Divisions: | Philosophy, Art History, History, and Humanities > Institut für Philosophie > Lehrstuhl für Theoretische Philosophie (Prof. Dr. phil Hans Rott) |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Gernot Deinzer |
| Date Deposited: | 14 Dec 2018 13:16 |
| Last Modified: | 18 Feb 2019 14:51 |
| URI: | https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/1421 |
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