Buchholz, Wolfgang and Sandler, Todd (2017) Successful Leadership in Global Public Good Provision: Incorporating Behavioural Approaches. ENVIRONMENTAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, 67 (3). pp. 591-607. ISSN 0924-6460, 1573-1502
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In the standard model of voluntary public good provision and other game theoretic models, climate-friendly leadership of a country is not successful: A unilateral increase of this country's greenhouse gas abatement measures, i.e., contributions to the global public good of climate protection, will not lead to a positive reaction by the other countries but instead trigger a reduction of their abatement efforts and thus a crowding-out effect. In this paper it is shown how this undesired consequence need no longer occur when elements of behavioral economics are incorporated in the otherwise standard model of public good provision. In particular, strategic complementarities between the public good contribution of the leading country and those of the follower may result either if the follower has specific non-egoistic or other-regarding preferences or if the leader's contribution positively affects the follower's beliefs, i.e., his conjectural variations, about the leader's behaviour.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | PRIVATE PROVISION; CLIMATE POLICY; ENVIRONMENTAL-PROBLEMS; CONJECTURAL VARIATIONS; VOLUNTARY PROVISION; SOCIAL PREFERENCES; UNILATERAL ACTIONS; GAME-THEORY; RECIPROCITY; PERSPECTIVE; Climate protection; Voluntary public good provision; Other-regarding preferences; Conjectural variations |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Divisions: | Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Finanzwissenschaft, insbesondere Umweltökonomie (Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Buchholz) |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Gernot Deinzer |
| Date Deposited: | 14 Dec 2018 13:16 |
| Last Modified: | 19 Feb 2019 07:05 |
| URI: | https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/1638 |
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