Determinants of moral hazard in research and development supply relations: Empirical results beyond the agency-theory explanation

Kloyer, Martin and Helm, Roland and Aust, Christin (2019) Determinants of moral hazard in research and development supply relations: Empirical results beyond the agency-theory explanation. MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, 40 (1). pp. 64-78. ISSN 0143-6570, 1099-1468

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Abstract

Moral hazard can hinder both the realization and the effectiveness of research and development (R&D) supply relations. However, to the best of our knowledge, there have been no empirical studies investigating the determinants of moral hazard under the specific circumstances of R&D supply relations. Based on a study on 104 cases, this article will help to fill that gap. The results not only confirm information asymmetries as determinants, as predicted by principal-agent theory, but also reveal surprising effects of additional factors. Thus, we show that the general explanation of moral hazard needs to be adapted to the specifics of a concrete exchange situation.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: SAFEGUARDING SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS; INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS; STATISTICAL CONTROL; TRANSACTION COSTS; MODERATING ROLE; OPPORTUNISM; PERFORMANCE; FIRM; ANTECEDENTS; ALLIANCES;
Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
Divisions: Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre
Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre > Lehrstuhl für Betriebswirtschaft, insbesondere Strategisches Industriegütermarketing (Prof. Dr. Roland Helm)
Depositing User: Dr. Gernot Deinzer
Date Deposited: 22 Apr 2020 09:24
Last Modified: 22 Apr 2020 09:24
URI: https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/27944

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