Buchholz, Wolfgang and Haupt, Alexander and Peters, Wolfgang (2005) International environmental agreements and strategic voting. SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 107 (1). pp. 175-195. ISSN 0347-0520,
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This paper explores the outcome of an international environmental agreement when the governments are elected by their citizens. It also considers a voter's incentives for supporting candidates who are less green than she is. In the extreme case of "global" pollution, the elected politicians pay no attention to the environment, and the resulting international agreement is totally ineffective. Moreover, if governments cannot negotiate and have to decide non-cooperatively (and voters are aware of this), the elected politicians can be greener, ecological damage can be lower and the median voter's payoff can be higher than in the case with bargaining.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | DELEGATION; PREFERENCES; EMISSIONS; international environmental agreements; strategic delegation; Nash bargaining; majority voting; transboundary pollution |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Divisions: | Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Entpflichtete oder im Ruhestand befindliche Professoren > Lehrstuhl für Finanzwissenschaft, insbesondere Umweltökonomie (Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Buchholz) |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Gernot Deinzer |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Jun 2021 08:57 |
| Last Modified: | 21 Jun 2021 08:57 |
| URI: | https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/36824 |
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