Beissinger, Thomas and Egger, Hartmut (2004) Dynamic wage bargaining if benefits are tied to individual wages. OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES, 56 (3). pp. 437-460. ISSN 0030-7653,
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In dynamic wage bargaining models it is usually assumed that individual unemployment benefits are a fraction of the average wage level. In most countries, however, unemployment benefits are instead tied to the previous level of individually earned wages. We show how the analysis has to be modified if this fact is taken into account and compare our findings for the wage-setting curve with outcomes under other unemployment compensation schemes. From this comparison it becomes evident how the shape and position of the wage-setting curve depends on the specification of the unemployment benefit system. We also demonstrate that a reduction of unemployment benefits of those who become unemployed after the bargaining period leads to higher equilibrium unemployment.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | EMPLOYMENT; UNIONS; |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Divisions: | Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Gernot Deinzer |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Jul 2021 09:25 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Jul 2021 09:25 |
| URI: | https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/37512 |
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