Oechssler, Joerg and Roider, Andreas and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2015) Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work? JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT, 171 (4). pp. 565-588. ISSN 0932-4569,
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)Abstract
Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale Internet experiment, we investigate whether a 24-hour cooling-off period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects receive lottery tickets for several large prizes. In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling off reduces the rejection rate further. In the cash treatment, rejections are more frequent and remain so after cooling off. We also study the effect of subjects' degree of "cognitive reflection" on their behavior. (JEL: C78, C99, D8)
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING; ULTIMATUM GAME; COGNITIVE REFLECTION; INTERNET EXPERIMENT; FAIRNESS; LEGISLATION; RECIPROCITY; COMPETITION; BEHAVIOR; MARKETS; |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Divisions: | Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Mikroökonomik (Prof. Dr. Andreas Roider) |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Gernot Deinzer |
| Date Deposited: | 06 May 2019 07:14 |
| Last Modified: | 06 May 2019 07:14 |
| URI: | https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/4370 |
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