Mechtenberg, Lydia and Muehlheusser, Gerd and Roider, Andreas (2020) Whistleblower protection: Theory and experimental evidence. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 126: 103447. ISSN 0014-2921, 1873-572X
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Whistleblowing by employees plays a major role in uncovering corporate fraud. Recent laws and global policy recommendations aim at facilitating whistleblower protection to enhance the willingness to report and to increase the detection and deterrence of misbehavior. We study these issues in a theory-guided laboratory experiment. As expected, protecting whistleblowers leads to more reporting of misbehavior. However, the predicted improvements in detection and deterrence do not materialize in the experiment. This is mainly driven by prosecutors being less inclined to investigate upon a report when protection is in place. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | INCENTIVES; INTENTIONS; FAIRNESS; Corporate fraud; Corruption; Whistleblowing; Business ethics; Cheap-talk games; Laboratory experiment |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Divisions: | Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Mikroökonomik (Prof. Dr. Andreas Roider) |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Gernot Deinzer |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Mar 2021 12:42 |
| Last Modified: | 19 Mar 2021 12:42 |
| URI: | https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/44324 |
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