Dittrich, Marcus and Staedter, Silvio (2021) Monitoring 'lemons': why lower productivity workers are sometimes monitored more closely. APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS, 28 (9). pp. 737-741. ISSN 1350-4851, 1466-4291
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We analyse workplace monitoring in a principal-agent model with two types of workers who differ in their productivity. The firm decides on the effort level, the wage and the monitoring intensity for both workers. We find that the elasticities of the workers' effort-cost function and the firm's monitoring-cost function affect the firm's monitoring intensity. Our results imply that the firm might monitor the low-productive worker more closely than the high-productive worker.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | WORKPLACE SURVEILLANCE; Principal-agent model; incentive contracts; moral hazard; workplace monitoring |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Divisions: | Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Mikroökonomik (Prof. Dr. Andreas Roider) |
| Depositing User: | Petra Gürster |
| Date Deposited: | 13 Apr 2021 08:14 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Apr 2021 08:14 |
| URI: | https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/44389 |
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