Buchholz, Wolfgang and Liu, Weifeng (2020) Global public goods and unilateral matching mechanisms. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, 22 (2). pp. 338-354. ISSN 1097-3923, 1467-9779
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)Abstract
While conventional agreements on international public goods require bilateral or multilateral cooperation, we show that unilateral action through matching mechanisms with a self-commitment device can possibly generate Pareto-improving outcomes. Even without commitment, unilateral matching may also benefit both players at corner situations. We further characterize the conditions under which this desirable outcome is achieved, particularly highlighting the role of the income distribution and its interplay with the preferences. Moreover, we propose a variant of unilateral matching that can generate Pareto-improving outcomes regardless of the preferences and the income distribution, indicating that income inequality may not be an obstacle for improving public good provision through unilateral matching.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | PRIVATE PROVISION; |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Divisions: | Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Entpflichtete oder im Ruhestand befindliche Professoren > Lehrstuhl für Finanzwissenschaft, insbesondere Umweltökonomie (Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Buchholz) |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Gernot Deinzer |
| Date Deposited: | 29 Mar 2021 07:12 |
| Last Modified: | 29 Mar 2021 07:12 |
| URI: | https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/44859 |
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