Conditional cooperation: Type stability across games

Eichenseer, Michael and Moser, Johannes (2020) Conditional cooperation: Type stability across games. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 188: 108941. ISSN 0165-1765, 1873-7374

Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)

Abstract

To classify cooperation types, a sequential prisoner's dilemma and a one-shot public goods game are convenient experimental setups. We explore the within subject stability of cooperation preferences in these two games. We find that the prisoner's dilemma performs well in identifying conditional cooperators while it is only an imperfect tool for identifying selfish types in the public goods game. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: ; Conditional cooperation; Public goods game; Sequential prisoner's dilemma; Discrete behavioral types
Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
Divisions: Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Mikroökonomik (Prof. Dr. Andreas Roider)
Depositing User: Dr. Gernot Deinzer
Date Deposited: 29 Mar 2021 11:34
Last Modified: 29 Mar 2021 11:34
URI: https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/45011

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item