Buchholz, Wolfgang and Nett, Lorenz and Peters, Wolfgang (1998) The strategic advantage of being less skilled. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 60 (1). pp. 35-39. ISSN 0165-1765, 1873-7374
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)Abstract
Ability need not pay if public goods are financed by voluntary contributions. This result, first shown for exogenously given income is reinforced if income is endogenously generated. In equilibrium, welfare of complete free riders is ranked according to their wage rate, whereas for contributors a higher productivity is disadvantageous. Furthermore, it can be shown that the set of contributors consists of the skilled agents and only the less productive will act as complete free riders. This results in a strong incentive for being less skilled. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | PUBLIC-GOODS; PRIVATE PROVISION; VOLUNTARY; private provision of public goods; reverse ranking; strategic advantage |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Divisions: | Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Entpflichtete oder im Ruhestand befindliche Professoren > Lehrstuhl für Finanzwissenschaft, insbesondere Umweltökonomie (Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Buchholz) |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Gernot Deinzer |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Feb 2023 11:01 |
| Last Modified: | 16 Feb 2023 11:01 |
| URI: | https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/49690 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
