Buchholz, Wolfgang and Haslbeck, Christian (1997) Strategic manipulation of property rights in Coasean bargaining. JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT, 153 (4). pp. 630-640. ISSN 0932-4569, 1614-0559
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
In a model of Coasean bargaining over externalities it is described how agents can manipulate their opponent's reservation utility by strategic actions at a pre-bargaining stage, such as the choice of a pollution technology. This may imply a misallocation of resources, and opening up trade possibilities will not necessarily lead to a Pareto improvement. This problem is specific to bargaining over externalities and will never occur in the exchange of private goods. It is concluded that the government has to supplement liability rules by additional restrictions on the agents' rights.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | THEOREM |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Divisions: | Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Entpflichtete oder im Ruhestand befindliche Professoren > Lehrstuhl für Finanzwissenschaft, insbesondere Umweltökonomie (Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Buchholz) |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Gernot Deinzer |
| Date Deposited: | 01 Mar 2023 11:57 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Mar 2023 11:57 |
| URI: | https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/50366 |
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