Buchholz, Wolfgang and Cornes, Richard and Peters, Wolfgang and Ruebbelke, Dirk (2015) Pareto improvement through unilateral matching of public good contributions: The role of commitment. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 132. pp. 9-12. ISSN 0165-1765, 1873-7374
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)Abstract
When providing public goods through voluntary contributions, a donor may introduce unilateral matching in order to reduce underprovision of the public good and thus inefficiency. By itself, however, matching benefits the donor but harms the recipient. We apply Comes and Hartley's aggregative game approach to provide a novel graphical explanation of this transfer paradox, and also show how it may be avoided by introducing a commitment device. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | COLLECTIVE ACTION; Voluntary public good provision; Matching; Commitment |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Divisions: | Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Finanzwissenschaft, insbesondere Umweltökonomie (Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Buchholz) |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Gernot Deinzer |
| Date Deposited: | 08 Jul 2019 09:18 |
| Last Modified: | 08 Jul 2019 09:18 |
| URI: | https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/5256 |
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