ALTHAMMER, W (1992) FISCAL INCENTIVES IN A MODEL OF EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT - A COMMENT. JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT, 148 (2). pp. 347-352. ISSN 0932-4569,
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
FEHR [1990] develops a model of wage negotiations where the resulting wage leads to unemployment and discusses several possibilities for fiscal policies. Two main objections are raised: when derived consistently, the bargained wage does not depend on the unemployment rate. This implausible result is due to the extreme objective of the workers in the bargaining process and therefore criticized. The policy measure favored by Fehr may be successful in reaching full employment, but it is based on a curious understanding of the state's role in market economies.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | TRADE-UNIONS; OUTSIDERS; |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Gernot Deinzer |
| Last Modified: | 19 Oct 2022 08:44 |
| URI: | https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/54516 |
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