Mueller, Marvin M. M. and Boehm, Kim Leonardo and Renz, Erich (2023) Pay or nudge employees into change? A theoretical and experimental investigation of the effect of nudging for organizational change. MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, 44 (6). pp. 3666-3695. ISSN 0143-6570, 1099-1468
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)Abstract
Organizational change often fails due to employees' resistance to change resulting in unforeseen expenses, delays, or other disruptions in organizations. In our experiment, we compare behavioral interventions-a pro-change default rule and a pro-change recommendation-with a costly pay raise to foster supportive behavior. In regard to the pure nudge used (default), we support its effectiveness in enhancing change-related success. In line with our model and based on the assumption of low decision confidence in change settings, we find that a preference nudge (recommendation) lacks a corresponding effect. In addition, we find that a pay raise has a positive effect that is likely to be triggered by positive reciprocity. If this pay raise fails to materialize, we report supporting evidence for negative reciprocity. We compare the effect sizes for these nudges and the pay raise and provide insights for the relative cost-effectiveness of such nudges compared to a pay raise for organizational change. We conclude with managerial implications.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | GIFT-EXCHANGE; PUBLIC-GOODS; BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS; NEGATIVE RECIPROCITY; SELF-EFFICACY; RESISTANCE; DETERMINANTS; DISCLOSURE; PROVISION; ATTITUDES; |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Divisions: | Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre > Lehrstuhl für Innovations- und Technologiemanagement (Prof. Dr. Michael Dowling) |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Gernot Deinzer |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Mar 2024 10:27 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Mar 2024 10:27 |
| URI: | https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/59720 |
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