Kraft, Tim (2014) Transmission arguments against knowledge closure are still fallacious. SYNTHESE, 191 (12). pp. 2617-2632. ISSN 0039-7857, 1573-0964
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Transmission arguments against closure of knowledge base the case against closure on the premise that a necessary condition for knowledge is not closed. Warfield argues that this kind of argument is fallacious whereas Brueckner, Murphy and Yan try to rescue it. According to them, the transmission argument is no longer fallacious once an implicit assumption is made explicit. I defend Warfield's objection by arguing that the various proposals for the unstated assumption either do not avoid the fallacy or turn the central premise of the transmission argument, namely that a necessary condition is not closed, into a redundant and superfluous premise. I conclude that Warfield's advice is still to be heeded: Arguments against closure must not rely essentially on the premise that a necessary condition for knowledge is not closed.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | EPISTEMIC CLOSURE; FAIL; Knowledge; Closure; Transmission arguments |
| Subjects: | 100 Philosophy & psychology > 100 Philosophy |
| Divisions: | Philosophy, Art History, History, and Humanities > Institut für Philosophie |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Gernot Deinzer |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Sep 2019 07:36 |
| Last Modified: | 16 Sep 2019 07:36 |
| URI: | https://pred.uni-regensburg.de/id/eprint/9847 |
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